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On the nature of *pradhāna*

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In the middle of his refutation of the Sāṃkhya philosophy which he presents in his Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya on sūtra 2.2.1, Śaṅkara attacks one aspect of his opponents' view in the following words:¹

*tathā parimitānām bhedānām mūlāṅkurādīnām saṃsargapūrvakatvaṃ dṛṣṭvā
bāhyādhyātmikānām bhedānām parimitatvāt saṃsargapūrvakatvaṃ anumimānasya
sattvarajastamasām api saṃsargapūrvakatvaprasaṅgaḥ, parimitatvāviśeṣāt*

Deussen (1887: 318-319) translated this passage as follows:

Ferner: wenn man aus der Wahrnehmung, dass die begrenzten Unterschiede, z.B. die Wurzel und die Pflanze, ein gemeinschaftliches Erschaffensein zur Voraussetzung haben, daraus schliesst, dass die äusseren und inneren Unterschiede der Dinge, weil sie sich gegenseitig einschränken, ein gemeinschaftliches Erschaffensein zur Voraussetzung haben (vgl. Sāṃkhya-kārikā 15), nun dann folgt, dass auch die drei Guṇa's *Sattvam*, *Rajas* und *Tamas* [nicht wie die Sāṃkhya's meinen, die ursprünglichen Bestimmungen der Urmaterie sind, sondern] ein solches gemeinschaftliches Erschaffensein zur Voraussetzung haben, weil sie ebenso gut sich gegenseitig einschränken.

This translation is problematic for various reasons. To begin with, it is not clear why things that limit each other (*sich gegenseitig einschränken*) should for that reason have been created together (*gemeinschaftliches Erschaffensein*). Moreover, the Sanskrit term translated as *gemeinschaftliches Erschaffensein* is *saṃsarga*, which does not normally have that meaning according to the dictionaries. The translation *Pflanze* ('plants') for *aṅkura*,

¹ Perhaps because the Sāṃkhya argument and its rejection by Śaṅkara cover no more than a few lines, it does not figure in the summary of the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya by Karl H. Potter in the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies vol. III (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1981, p. 153).

finally, which really means ‘sprout’, is incorrect; we will see below that this is more than a minor point.

Other translators propose different interpretations. George Thibaut (1904: 366-367) translates:

(Turning to the next Sāṅkhya argument which infers the existence of the *pradhāna* from the limitation of all effects), we remark that he who concludes that all inward and outward effects depend on a conjunction of several things, because they are limited (a conclusion based on a the observation that some limited effects such as root and sprout, &c. depend on the conjunction of several things), is driven to the conclusion that the three constituents of the *pradhāna*, viz. Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several antecedents; for they also are limited.

Swami Gambhirananda (1972: 370) translates, similarly:

Similarly if somebody infers that ‘since limited products like roots, sprouts, etc. are born out of a combination of many materials, therefore all external and corporeal modifications too must have been similarly formed out of the combination of many materials; for they too are limited’, then one will be faced with the predicament of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* also springing out of a combination of many materials, they too being equally limited.

A.J. Alston, finally, translates (1989: 179):

A further point is that if from observation of the fact that all limited effects involve a composite cause (*saṃsarga*), as in the case of the seed and the sprout, one infers that the cause of the whole world and of external objects and mental phenomena (i.e. Nature and all its evolutes) must also be composite (composed of the three constituents, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*), because it is also limited, then it would follow that the constituents *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* themselves must also have a composite cause, since they, too, are limited.

These translations are to be preferred to the one by Deussen. They agree, moreover, with some of the Sanskrit commentaries. Thibaut cites in a note (p. 367 n. 1) the following words from Ānandagiri's Nyāyanirṇaya (NyāNir, p. 416 l. 43):

*saṃsargapūrvakatvaprasaṅga iti guṇānām saṃsṛṣṭānekavastuprakṛtikatvaprasaktir
ity arthaḥ*

The expression *saṃsargapūrvakatvaprasaṅgaḥ* means: the consequence that the [three] constituents (*guṇa*, i.e., *sattva*, *rajas*, and *taṃas*) are[, each of them,] by nature composite and plural.

Govindānanda's Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā states, similarly (BhRaPra, p. 416 l. 11):

*buddhyādīnām parimitatvena saṃsargapūrvakatvasiddhau saṃsṛṣṭāny anekāni
sattvarajastamāṃsi sidhyanti*

If it is established that [divisions] like the *buddhi* etc. are *saṃsargapūrvaka* for being limited, then it is established that *sattva*, *rajas* and *taṃas* are [each of them] composite and plural.

And yet these interpretations are not fully satisfactory. They leave us with the question why roots and sprouts are given as examples of composite things,² rather than whole plants or mountains, not to speak of the among Indian thinkers favourite chariots and houses. More problematic is that Śāṅkara's passage presents a Sāṃkhya argument in order to refute it; it is open to doubt whether the specific argument that appears in these translations has ever been used by the Sāṃkhyas.

Deussen was no doubt right in drawing attention to Sāṃkhyakārikā 15, which enumerates a number of reasons from which the existence of the unmanifest (*avyakta*) can supposedly be deduced. The first of these two reasons are *parimāṇa* and *samanvaya*.³ As a matter of fact, the above passage in Śāṅkara's commentary occurs immediately after another one which deals with, and rejects, *samanvaya* as a factor from which the Sāṃkhya believes to be able to infer the existence of *pradhāna* as ultimate cause of the world. It seems therefore likely that Śāṅkara criticises here the arguments that are presented in that verse of the

² Alston, referring to Belvalkar, observes in a note: "Seed, soil, water, air, and light, etc., are involved".

³ SK 15-16: *bhedānām parimāṇāt samanvayāt ... kāraṇam asty avyaktam ...*

Sāṃkhyakārikā (which does not necessarily imply that he took them from the Sāṃkhyakārikā; see below).

Sāṃkhyakārikā 15 gives no explanation of what exactly is meant by *parimāṇa* in this context. Its commentaries do, but most of these explanations are so different from Śaṅkara's passage that little help in understanding our passage can be derived from them (see the appendix). Note however that the Yuktidīpikā, which is known to sometimes preserve early interpretations,⁴ provides the following in its context incomprehensible enumeration (YD p. 141 l. 18-19):

mūlāṅkuraparṇanāladaṇḍabusatuṣaśūkapaṣpakṣīrataṇḍulakaṇānām

of roots, sprouts, leaves, stalks, sticks, chaff, husk, awns, flowers, sap, rice-grains

Whatever the reason why this enumeration is given,⁵ it is clear that it can be looked upon as an extension of Śaṅkara's *mūlāṅkurādīnām*. And it is also clear that all the items of the enumeration designate parts of plants, or of a plant.

More help may be derived from the commentary called Jayamaṅgalā of a certain Śaṅkara, who is different from the author of the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya. Here the words *bhedānām parimāṇāt* of kārikā 15 are explained as follows (JayMañ, p. 80 l. 23-26):

.../ bhidyanta iti bhedāḥ, kāryaviśeṣās teṣāṃ ekas saṃsargī dṛṣṭaḥ parimāṇāc ca/ bhedānām parimitatvād ity arthaḥ/ yena ca parimitās teṣāṃ ekaḥ saṃsargī dṛṣṭaḥ/ yathā mūlāṅkurapatrakāṇḍaprasavapuṣpa(tu)ṣataṇḍulakaṇānām bhedānām vṛhiḥ ...

Divisions (*bheda*) [are so called] because they are divided (*bhidyante*); [they are] special products. Of those [special products] it is observed that one thing combines them (*saṃsargin*), because of their measure (*parimāṇa*). This means: because the divisions are limited (*parimita*). And that by which they are limited, [that] is the one thing that combines them; this much has been observed. An example is the rice plant [which is a combination] of roots, sprouts, leaves, stem, blossoms, flowers, husk and rice-grains.

The explanation in the Jayamaṅgalā of the argument *parimāṇāt* is exceptional among the commentaries on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā, so much so that Solomon's study of these commentaries (1974: 39-40) does not even mention it. For our present purposes it is

⁴ Cp. Bronkhorst, 1999a: 46 n. 113.

⁵ The immediate context in the Yuktidīpikā provides no clue; see the appendix below.

however important, for the author of the Jayamaṅgalā, like his namesake the author of the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya and like the Yuktidīpikā, gives an enumeration of the parts of a plant; moreover, the first two of these authors use the term *saṃsarga*. This is not likely to be mere coincidence, and we are entitled to ask whether the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya borrowed from the Jayamaṅgalā or vice-versa, or whether perhaps both borrowed from an earlier text.

Unfortunately little is known about the date of the Jayamaṅgalā. The volume on Sāṃkhya of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies says the following about it (EIP IV p. 272): “The date and authorship of Jayamaṅgalā is simply an open question, although Chakravarti's [(1951: 164-168)] claim that it precedes Vācaspati and comes after Yuktidīpikā appears to be the most likely avenue for further research.” If Chakravarti's claim is correct, the author of the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya may not have borrowed from the Jayamaṅgalā. However, borrowing in the opposite direction is highly improbable, given that the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya presents the argument under consideration only in order to reject it. It seems much more likely that both these texts drew upon an earlier text that may no longer exist today.

About the earlier history of Sāṃkhya we owe a great deal to the work of Erich Frauwallner. His article “Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya-Systems” (1958) in particular is of considerable importance. In this article Frauwallner draws attention to passages in Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and in Siṃhasūri's commentary on Mallavādin's *Dvādaśāranayacakra* which are cited or abbreviated from a Sāṃkhya work which no longer exists. This work may have been the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* of Vārṣagaṇya.⁶ For our present purposes it is particularly important that some of the passages from this text preserved in Siṃhasūri's *Nyāyāgamānusārinī* deal with proofs of the existence of *pradhāna*. Unfortunately Siṃhasūri's presentation of the Sāṃkhya arguments is corrupt and condensed, sometimes beyond comprehension.⁷ It is however clear that there are five direct (*vīta*) proofs, which are dealt with in the following order: (i) *bhedānām anvaya darśanāt* (NĀgAnu I, p. 314,7), (ii) *bhedānām parimāṇāt* (NĀgAnu I, p. 314,15), (iii) *bhedānām kāryakāraṇabhāvāt* (NĀgAnu I, p. 318,7), (iv) *śaktimadavasthāmātratvāc chaktinām* (NĀgAnu I, p. 319, 7), (v) *vaiśvarūpyasyāvibhāga prāpter deśakālapramāṇabalarūpapratyāsatter avāśyambhāvvyucchedānucchedābhyām ca nivṛtteḥ* (NĀgAnu I, p. 320,1-2). Sāṃkhyakārikā 15 has what would seem to be the same enumeration, but in a different order: *bhedānām*

⁶ On the name of this author, see Chakravarti, 1951: 135 ff.; Wezler, 1985: 14 n. 6.

⁷ Frauwallner, 1958: 92-93 (231-232): “Der Text dieses ganzen Abschnittes ist vielfach entstellt und schwer verständlich. Siṃhasūri hat nämlich stark gekürzt. Besonders die direkten und indirekten Beweisführungen sind teilweise bis zur Unkenntlichkeit zusammengestrichen.”

parimāṇāt (= [ii]), *samanvayāt* (= [i]), *śaktiṭaḥ pravṛtteś ca* (= [iv]), *kāraṇakāryavibhāgāt* (= [iii]), *avibhāgād vaiśvarūpyasya* (= [v]) [*kāraṇam asty avyaktam* 16a]. Śāṅkara's commentary on Brahmasūtra 2.2.1 deals with the first three of these arguments in the following order: *anvaya*, *parimāṇa*, *kāryakāraṇabhāva*; argument (iv) is dealt with under Brahmasūtra 2.2.2. This is the order which we also find in Siṃhasūri's Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī, but not in the Sāṃkhyakārikā.⁸ It suggests that Śāṅkara followed the same text that is criticised by Siṃhasūri and, presumably, Mallavādin, probably the Śaṣṭitantra.⁹

This impression is confirmed by the presence, in Siṃhasūri's Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī, of the following specification of the proof *bhedānām parimāṇāt* (NĀgAnu I p. 318,4-6):

*tasmāt parimitatvāt saṃsargapūrvakā bhedaḥ, vṛhāv iva saṃsṛṣṭā
mūlāṅkuraparṇanālakāṇḍaprasavatuṣaśūkapuṣpakṣīrataṇḍulakaṇabhāvāḥ, yathā vā
śukraśoṇitasamṣṛṣṭāḥ
kalalārbudamāṃsapeśīśarīravvyūhabālyakaumārāyauvanasthāvirā bhāvā iti.*

Therefore, because they are limited (*parimita*), the divisions presuppose their combination (*saṃsarga*), just like the states of root, sprout, leaf, stalk, stem, blossom, husk, awn, flower, sap and rice grain that are combined in a rice plant, or like the states of [embryonic] bodily disposition called *kalala*, *arbuda*, and *māṃsapeśi*, as well as the states of infancy, childhood, youth and old age, which are combinations of sperm and blood.

This passage is close both to what we find in the Jayamaṅgalā and to the position ascribed to his Sāṃkhya opponent by the author of the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya. It can therefore no longer be denied that Śāṅkara the author of the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya, and the author of the Jayamaṅgalā, as well as the author of the Yuktidīpikā to at least some extent, drew upon an earlier Sāṃkhya text, which may well have been the Śaṣṭitantra of Vārṣaganya. It is now further possible to translate the passage from the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya cited above in the light of the passages from the Jayamaṅgalā and the Dvādaśāranayacakra, as follows:¹⁰

⁸ One should not conclude from this that Śāṅkara did not know the Sāṃkhyakārikā. On Brahmasūtra 1.4.11, for example, he cites the whole of Sāṃkhyakārikā 3 (without mentioning the name "Sāṃkhyakārikā").

⁹ Note in this connection that Bhāskara's commentary on Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya 2.2.1 attributes the following words to the Sāṃkhyas, without specifying their source (BSūBhā/Bhā p. 109, 17-18): *anvayāt parimāṇac chaktiṭaḥ pravṛtteś ca / kāraṇakāryavibhāgād avibhāgād vaiśvarūpyasya* //. This quotation has the first two items in the order used by Śāṅkara, to be sure, but is otherwise so close to Sāṃkhyakārikā 15 that one is entitled to wonder whether it is an alternative version of that verse. It is clear from Bhāskara's subsequent discussion that he did indeed read the first two items in this order.

¹⁰ One is here reminded of Mahā-bh I p. 321 l. 2-3 (on P. 1.4.21): *bahuṣu bahuvacanam ity ucyate/keṣu bahuṣu/ artheṣu/ yady evaṃ vṛkṣaḥ plakṣaḥ atrāpi prāpnoti/ bahavas te 'rthā mūlaṃ skandhaḥ phalaṃ palāśam iti/*

*tathā parimitānām bhedānām mūlāṅkurādīnām saṃsargapūrvakatvaṃ dṛṣṭvā
bāhyādhyātmikānām bhedānām parimitatvāt saṃsargapūrvakatvaṃ anumimānasya
sattvarajastamasām api saṃsargapūrvakatvaprasaṅgaḥ, parimitatvāviśeṣāt*

For someone who infers — having seen that divisions, such as roots, sprouts etc. (which are divisions of a plant), being limited, presuppose their combination (*saṃsarga*) — that external and internal divisions, because they are limited, presuppose their combination, it would follow that *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, too, presuppose their combination, for they are equally limited.

* * *

The different passages presented above present us with a Sāṃkhya doctrine in which *pradhāna* is apparently conceived of as the combination, perhaps we can say the totality, of all that exists. This is again confirmed in a passage of Simhasūri's Nyāyāgamanusāriṇī which gives the following résumé of the five proofs (I p. 320 l. 7-8): *tasmād asti pradhānam iti ebhiḥ pañcabhir vītaiḥ samanvaya-parimāṇa-upakāra-śaktipravṛtti-vaiśvarūpyagatyākhyaiḥ sāmānya-saṃsarga-ekakarṭṛ-śaktimacchakty-avibhāgasamjñam pradhānam siddham*. This doctrine appears to have been held by Sāṃkhya thinkers at some time but has been all but lost in the surviving texts.¹¹ According to this doctrine, the things that derive from *pradhāna* are its divisions. Śaṅkara's criticism of this position is not that *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* would be composite and plural, as several commentators have proposed, but the opposite: there would be no place for these three constituents in a single *pradhāna*.

It will be of interest to cite here another passage from Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya, this one on sūtra 2.1.29. Here too Śaṅkara criticises the Sāṃkhya:

*pradhānavādino 'pi hi niravayavam aparicchinnam śabdādihīnam pradhānam
sāvayavasya paricchinnasya śabdādimataḥ kāryasya kāraṇam iti svapakṣaḥ/*

The own position of the Sāṃkhya (*pradhānavādin*), too, is that *pradhāna* — which has no parts, is undivided and without [qualities] such as sound — is the cause of an

¹¹ The only modern full-length study dedicated to *prakṛti* (Jacobsen, 1999) is not aware of it either. Larson (1987: 69), on the other hand, observes: “Analytically, each manifest component is a ‘part’ of the ‘whole’ that is primordial materiality.” See further Bhāskara on Brahmasūtra 2.1.10: *niravayavam ... pradhāna[m]*, and note 12 below.

effect which does have parts, which is divided and which does possess [qualities] such as sound.

We know from Sāṃkhyakārikā 10 that the non-manifest (*avyakta* = *pradhāna*) is the opposite of the manifest (*vyakta*) and that the latter has parts (*sāvayava*); this confirms that *pradhāna* has no parts. Śaṅkara's passage adds to this that *pradhāna* is undivided (*aparicchinna*), its effect divided (*paricchinna*). This strongly suggests, once again, that the creation of the world out of *pradhāna* consists in the division of *pradhāna*.

Consider now the following remark in the Yuktidīpikā (YD p. 155 l. 17-18):¹²

svakāryād dhi prathīyasī prakṛtir bhavatīti ca naḥ samayaḥ

For it is our doctrine that a *prakṛti* is larger than its effect.

In the derivational scheme of things adhered to by Sāṃkhya all but the final evolutes are *prakṛtis*. The present sentence states that each *prakṛti* is larger than its evolutes. *Pradhāna*, being the *mūlaprakṛti*, must as a result be larger than all its evolutes, and therefore presumably larger than all other existing things. Indeed, we also learn from Sāṃkhyakārikā 10 that the non-manifest (which is *pradhāna*) is omnipresent (*vyāpin*).¹³ These statements fit in well with the idea that *pradhāna* is the totality of all there is, even though they do not prove it.

The associated idea that all that is limited in size is therefore non-original and therefore created finds expression in the following line of the Yuktidīpikā (YD p. 155 l. 32):

iha yat paricchinnadeśaṃ tat kṛtakaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ tad yathā ghaṭaḥ

In this world it is observed that what occupies limited¹⁴ space has been made/created, as for example a jar.

This observation, which is far from evident to impartial outsiders, clearly reflect a fundamental attitude of the Sāṃkhya school of philosophy, at least of the branch represented in the Yuktidīpikā.

¹² Cp. Bronkhorst, 1999: 685 ff.

¹³ Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya on sūtra 2.2.38, speaking of "Sāṃkhya with God", confirms this: *pradhānapuruṣeśvarāṇāṃ sarvagatatvān niravayavatvāc ca*.

¹⁴ Note the use of *paricchinna*-, lit. "divided".

This same statement, in combination with the idea that *pradhāna* is the totality of all there is, suggests that each *prakṛti* is — or was at an earlier time, perhaps at the time of the Śaṣṭitantra — thought of as the combination of its evolutes. This in its turn would imply that the process of evolution out of *pradhāna* is — or was in the Śaṣṭitantra — an ongoing division, in which the final evolutes are the final parts. This last conclusion finds an interesting confirmation in the writings of a number of classical authors, who ascribed a position to the Sāṃkhya which is no longer part of its classical doctrine. According to these authors, Sāṃkhya held the opinion that material objects — and therefore the material elements themselves — are collections of qualities. Other texts teach us, moreover, that the qualities (sound, colour, etc.) were at one time thought of as the final evolutes.¹⁵ It goes without saying that the idea of qualities as final evolutes and at the same time as “parts” of elements fits in well with a vision of evolution as an ongoing division.

Appendix: other explanations of *parimāṇāt* in SK 15

As stated above, the commentaries on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā different from the Jayamaṅgalā do not offer any help in understanding Śaṅkara's statement in the Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya. The Yuktidīpikā, usually the most detailed and in general most important surviving commentary, explains the words *bhedānāṃ parimāṇāt* of the kārikā as follows (YD p. 141 l. 18-21):

*yat parimitaṃ tasya sata utpattir dṛṣṭā/ tad yathā mūlāṅkurapaṇṇanāladaṇḍabusatuṣa-
sūkapuṣpakṣīrataṇḍulakaṇṇānām/ parimitāś ca mahadahaṃkārendriyatanmātramahā-
bhūtalakṣaṇabhedāḥ/ tasmāt satkāraṇapūrvakāḥ/ yad eṣāṃ kāraṇaṃ tad avyaktam/*

The problematic nature of the enumeration in the second sentence has already been commented upon above. If one insists on interpreting this enumeration in the context provided by the Yuktidīpikā, all the parts of plants here enumerated must then illustrate the fact that limited things arise out of existing things, or out of an existing thing, which is strange. In the light of our preceding reflections we may now assume that this enumeration is what is left of an argument that has somehow disappeared in the Yuktidīpikā but has

¹⁵ See Bronkhorst, 1994: 311, with references to Aśvaghōṣa's Buddhacarita, the Mahābhārata, as well as to Strauss, 1913 and Frauwallner, 1927. A passage from the Śaṣṭitantra regained by Steinkellner (1999: 670-71, 675 (no. 8)) confirms the view that these qualities were thought of as evolutes: *śabdasparśarūparasagandhāḥ pañca trayāṇāṃ sukhaduḥkhamohānāṃ sanniveśaviśeṣāḥ*.

survived in the Jayamaṅgalā, in Śaṅkara's commentary on the Brahmasūtra, and of course in Siṃhasūri's Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī.

The Mātharavṛtti comments as follows (MāthVṛ, p. 25-26):

*asti pradhānam/ kutaḥ/ **bhedānām parimāṇāt**/ loke yatra kartāsti tasya
parimāṇam dṛṣṭam/ yathā kulālaḥ parimitāt mṛtpiṇḍāt parimitam eva ghaṭam kurute
prasthagrāhakam ādhakagrāhakam vā/ evaṃ vyaktaṃ parimitam/ ekā buddhir eko
'haṅkāraḥ pañca tanmātrāṇi ekādaśendriyāṇi pañca mahābhūtāni iti
trayaviṃśatikam/ evaṃ etat parimitam vyaktaṃ dṛṣṭvā 'numānena sādhayāmo 'sty
asya kāraṇam pradhānam yad vyaktaṃ parimitam utpādayati/ yadi ca pradhānam
kāraṇam na syān niṣparimāṇam idaṃ vyaktaṃ syāt/ asti cāsyā parimāṇam tasmād
asti pradhānam/*

The Gauḍapādabhāṣya repeats this passage in almost exactly the same words, as do the Sāṃkhya-saptati-vṛtti (V1) and the Sāṃkhya-vṛtti (V2). The commentary preserved in Chinese translation and translated into French by J. Takakusu seems to have been close to the above (Takakusu, 1904: 999):

‘Parce que les classes spécifiques sont finies.’ Dans ce monde une chose produite a une mesure, une dimension, un nombre; ainsi avec une quantité d'argile donnée, le potier fabrique des vases, d'un nombre limité. Supprimez la matière originelle (argile), et il n'y aura plus de mesure numérique ni de vase. Voyant que les vases ont une mesure numérique, nous savons qu'ils ont une matière originelle. La comparaison des fils constituant un vêtement est également applicable. Parmi les (vingt-cinq) principes, les principes évolués, le Mahat et les autres, possèdent également une mesure numérique. Quelle est cette mesure numérique? Le Mahat est un, le Sentiment du moi est un, les éléments subtils sont cinq, les organes sont onze et les grands éléments sont cinq. Quant à ces principes évolués, nous voyons qu'ils ont une mesure numérique. En raisonnant par analogie, nous savons qu'il y a une Nature (origine). S'il n'y avait pas une Nature, les principes évolués n'auraient pas de mesure numérique et ces principes eux-mêmes n'existeraient pas.

The Tattvakaumudī of Vācaspati Miśra has, in Ganganatha Jha's edition (important variants in Srinivasan's edition):

*parimāṇāt iti/ parimitatvāt, avyāpitvād iti yāvat/ vivādādhyāsītā mahadādibhedā
avyaktakāraṇavantah, parimitatvāt, ghaṭādivat/ ghaṭādayo hi parimitāḥ
mṛdādyavyaktakāraṇakā dṛṣṭāḥ/*

The Candrikā of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha explains:

*parimāṇāt parimitatvād avyāpitvāt, anekatvarūpabhedavattvād vā, yad yad anekam
avyāpi ca tat tat kāryam, bhavati ca mahadādikaṃ pratipuruṣaniyatatvād anekam
avyāpi ca, atas tatkāraṇam yogyatayā nityam ekam pradhānam eveti bhāvah/*

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- Can *Candrikā* of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha. In: Sāṃkhya Kārikā by Īśvarakṛṣṇa with Chandrikā commentary by Śrī Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, ed. Pt. Dhundhīrāja Śāstrī, Benares: The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1941.
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- NyāNir *Nyāyanirṇaya* of Ānandagiri. For the edition see BSūBhā 1).
- NĀgAnu *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* of Siṃhasūri. For the edition see DNC.
- P. Pāṇinian sūtra
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University, 1973.
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- YD *Yuktidīpikā*. ed. in Albrecht Wezler and Shujun Motegi, *Yuktidīpikā*: The
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Other abbreviations:

- EIP The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, ed. Karl H. Potter, Delhi 1970 ff.
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